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Abstract
Public health organizations face the problem of dispensing medications (i.e., vac-
cines, antibiotics, and others) to groups of affected populations during emergency situ-
ations, typically in the presence of complexities like demand stochasticity and limited
storage. We formulate a Markov decision process (MDP) model with two levels of
decisions: the upper-level decisions come from an inventory model that “controls” a
lower-level problem that optimizes dispensing decisions that take into consideration the
heterogeneous utility functions of the random set of arriving patients. We then derive
structural properties of the MDP model and propose an approximate dynamic pro-
gramming (ADP) algorithm that leverages structure in both the policy and the value
space (state-dependent basestocks and concavity, respectively). The algorithm can be
considered an actor-critic method; to our knowledge, this paper is the first to jointly
exploit policy and value structure within an actor-critic framework. We prove that the
policy and value function approximations each converge to their optimal counterparts
with probability one and provide a comprehensive numerical analysis showing improved
empirical convergence rates when compared to other ADP techniques. Finally, we pro-
vide a case study for the problem of dispensing naloxone (an overdose reversal drug)
via mobile needle exchange clinics amidst the ongoing opioid crisis. In particular, we
analyze the influence of surging naloxone prices on public health organizations’ harm
reduction efforts.
1 Introduction
Public health organizations manage “points-of-dispensing” (POD) for critical medical sup-
plies during emergency situations (e.g., the ongoing opioid crisis, the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic, meningitis outbreaks). In this paper, we consider the sequential problem of opti-
mizing inventory control and making dispensing decisions for a POD, which stores leftover
supplies from one period to the next. Our problem setting is specifically motivated by the
ongoing opioid overdose harm reduction efforts of public health organizations in cities across
the U.S., where the opioid epidemic was declared a public health emergency in 2017. In
particular, we are motivated by the Baltimore City Health Department’s (BCHD) naloxone
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distribution activities through mobile needle-exchange clinics. A novel point of emphasis
for our inventory model is the notion that the effectiveness of the public health intervention
can vary across different groups of the affected population (Lee et al., 2015; Bennett et al.,
2018). Therefore, instead of modeling demand in a homogeneous manner, we consider the
case where at each period, the stochastic demand information is revealed as a batch of pa-
tient attributes and inventory requests. The dispensing decision is computed by optimally
allocating the available resources to the patients so that a total utility is maximized.
The model we develop is this paper, however, is quite general and useful for related
problems in public health as well where demand heterogeneity may be an issue (e.g., vaccine
distribution). Other important characteristics of this problem include (1) demand nonsta-
tionarity, (2) the hierarchical relationship between inventory control and inventory dispens-
ing, and (3) the potential for limited storage capacity, especially in the case of mobile clinics
and in situations where personnel are limited (Dasaklis et al., 2012).
Exact computation of the optimal policy for this model is difficult when the number
of states is large or when the stochastic models are unknown. The main methodogical
contribution of the paper addresses these issues through a structured actor-critic algorithm;
our proposed method exploits structure in both the policy and the value function and can
discover near-optimal policies in a fully data-driven way. We now give four examples of
public health problems to which our model and algorithm can be applied.
Opioid Overdose Epidemic. The rate of opioid overdose deaths tripled between 2000
and 2014 in the United States (Rudd et al., 2016). More recently, in July 2017, it was
estimated that there are 142 American deaths each day due to overdose (Christie et al.,
2017). Naloxone is a drug that has the ability to reverse overdoses within seconds to minutes.
To save lives amidst the current opioid epidemic, it is critical for naloxone to be widely
distributed. Indeed, many harm reduction organizations, such as Baltimore Community
Risk Reduction within the Baltimore City Health Department (BCHD) or Prevention Point
Pittsburgh are undertaking the challenge by distributing naloxone free of charge to those in
need. BCHD sends a vehicle, which acts as a mobile clinic with limited storage capacity,
to visit various locations in and around the city of Baltimore. Residents, including drug
users, family members, and community members, are provided access to naloxone at these
locations.1 One challenge facing these organizations is that the utility of naloxone varies
across these groups: for example, Bennett et al. (2018) use data from Pittsburgh to conclude
that opioid users themselves are 10 times as likely to use the naloxone (on someone else) than
so-called “concerned non-users.” Therefore, the prioritization of certain “demand classes” is
an important consideration when naloxone is expensive or when quantities are limited; see,
e.g., Cohn (2017) for a report on rationing practices in Baltimore.
1The ability to dispense naloxone to non-users in Pennsylvania was made possible by Act 139.
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Influenza. The need for distinct demand classes was also observed for the case of vaccine
distribution during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. The H1N1 influenza virus first
emerged in Mexico and California in April 2009 (Neumann et al., 2009) and the pandemic
lasted until August 2010 (World Health Organization, 2010). Children and young adults
were disproportionately affected when compared to older adults (Kwan-Gett et al., 2009):
during April 15 and May 5, 2009, among the 642 confirmed infected patients in the U.S.
(ranging from 3 months to 81 years old), 60% were 18 years old or younger (Novel Swine-
Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Investigation Team, 2009). The reported H1N1 cases
from April 15 to July 24, 2009, show that the infected rate (number of cases per 100,000
population) of 0 to 4 age group is 17.6 times of the infected rate of 65 and older age group,
and the rate of 5 to 24 age group is 20.5 times of the rate of 65 and older age group (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009a). The Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practice (ACIP) recommended a priority group (about 159 million Americans), in which
there was a subset with highest priority (about 62 million Americans) (Rambhia et al.,
2010). Patients aged 65 and older were only considered for vaccination once the demand
amongst younger groups were met (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009b).
Hepatitis A. Hepatitis A outbreaks began in August 2017 and are currently (as of March
2018) ongoing in the states of California, Kentucky, Michigan, and Utah. Recent data from
February 28, 2018 shows 700 cases (21 deaths) in California, 125 cases (0 deaths) in Kentucky
771 cases (25 deaths) in Michigan, and 189 cases (0 deaths) in Utah (California Department
of Public Health, 2018; Kentucky Department of Public Health, 2018; Michigan Department
of Health and Human Services, 2018; Utah Department of Health, 2018). This outbreak
largely affects the homeless, drug users, and their direct contacts (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2018). Center for Disease Control (CDC) guidelines suggest that vaccine
inventory be conducted monthly to ensure adequate supplies and that the vaccine order
decisions take into account projected demand and storage capacity (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018), two
important aspects of our model. The CDC also recommends against overstocking, which
presents the risk of wastage and outdated vaccines.
Vaccines for Children Program. The measles epidemic in 1989 to 1991 revealed the
issue of low vaccination rate among children (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2014). Vaccines for Children (VFC) is a program started in 1994 that aims to reduce the
economic barriers of vaccination for disadvantaged children (Santoli et al., 1999; Zimmerman
et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2005). It supplies free vaccines (including influenza, hepatitis A,
hepatitis B, and measles) to registered providers, who in turn provide vaccinations to eligible
children (Zimmerman et al., 2001; Social Security Online, 2005). Before healthcare providers
are enrolled, VFC coordinators perform site visits to ensure proper storage practice (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). A study in 2012 found, however, that out of 45
VFC providers, 76% exposed VFC vaccines to inappropriate temperatures, and 16% kept
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expired VFC vaccines (Levinson, 2012).
Our Results. The main contributions of this paper are summarized below.
• In this paper, we first develop and analyze a finite-horizon MDP model that abstracts
the above problems into a single framework. The upper-level problem is an inven-
tory model that controls a lower-level dispensing optimization problem. Here, we
consider the setting where the intervention affects patients with different attributes
nonuniformly. The demand and patient-type distributions at each period depend on
an information process, which can represent past demand realizations or other external
information, such as weather.
• We then analyze the structural properties of the model. The MDP features basestock-
like structure in a discrete state setting and discretely-concave value functions; both of
these properties depend on the discrete-concavity observed in the lower-level problem.
The motivation for a discrete state formulation (rather than using the standard con-
tinuous state approximation) comes from the naloxone distribution application, where
demand quantities are relatively small.
• Next, we propose a new actor-critic algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Konda and
Tsitsiklis, 2000) that exploits the structural properties of the MDP. More specifically,
the algorithm tracks both policy and value function approximations (an identifying
feature of an “actor-critic” method) and utilizes the structure to improve the empiri-
cal convergence rate. This algorithm (and its general idea) is potentially of broader
interest, beyond the public health inventory application.
• Finally, we present a case study for the problem of dispensing naloxone to opioid
users via mobile clinics (as discussed above). In addition to computing approxima-
tions to the optimal replenishment and dispensing strategies, we are also interested in
understanding the effect of increasing naloxone prices on the ability of a public health
organization to widely distribute. A natural problem is: what is the marginal effect
on dispensing when there is a price increase in naloxone? In other words, for every
dollar increase in price, how many fewer kits of naloxone can we expect to dispense?
Our communications with the Baltimore City Health Department indicate that this
question is of significant interest to public health organizations due to the currently
surging prices of naloxone (Albright, 2016; Gupta et al., 2016; Luthra, 2017a).
The paper is organized as follows. A literature review is provided in Section 2. In Section 3,
we introduce the hierarchical MDP model and derive its structural properties. The proposed
actor-critic algorithm is given and discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we conduct numerical
experiments and finally present the naloxone case study in Section 7.
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2 Literature Review
In this section, we provide a brief review of related literature. The upper level inventory de-
cisions in this paper are closely related to both lost-sales and perishable inventory models. In
the lost-sales case, Nahmias (1979) constructs simple myopic approximations for three vari-
ations of the classical model with lead time. Ha (1997) studies a single-item, make-to-stock
production model with several demand classes and lost sales and constructs stock-rationing
levels for the optimal policy. Mohebbi (2003) focuses on random supply interruptions in
lost-sales inventory systems with positive lead times. Zipkin (2008a) finds that the standard
base-stock policy performs poorly compared to some other heuristic policies. We also refer
readers to Bijvank and Vis (2011) for a detailed review. Our public health application is also
somewhat related to the problems studied in perishable inventory models (Janssen et al.,
2016), even though our motivating application does not require us to explicitly model age.
Related to our hierarchical model is the case of multi-echelon systems, where, for ex-
ample, an upper echelon (e.g. a central warehouse) replenishes the inventory of a lower
echelon (e.g. a retailer) that serves demand (Clark and Scarf, 1960). Tan (1974) studies the
optimal ordering and allocation policies for the upper echelon and Graves (1996) constructs
an allocation policy for the multi-echelon system. In the model of Chen and Samroengraja
(2000), each retailer is allowed to replenish once from the warehouse during an ordering
cycle. Van Houtum et al. (2007) shows the optimality of base-stock policies and derives
newsvendor-type equations for the optimal base-stock levels.
The lower level of our model, where a limited quantity of inventory is allocated to a
set of heterogenous patients, is related to inventory rationing. In our model, each patient
type achieves reward according to a certain utility function, mirroring our discussion above
of how public health interventions can have varying levels of success across patients with
differing attributes. Rationing models from the literature can be categorized into continuous
review systems (Teunter and Haneveld, 2008; Fadıloğlu and Bulut, 2010; Ding et al., 2016)
or periodic review systems (Paul and Rajendran, 2011; Hung et al., 2012; Chew et al., 2013).
These models can also be distinguished into the lost-sales case (Ha, 1997; Melchiors et al.,
2000; Cheng et al., 2011) or the backlogging case (Teunter and Haneveld, 2008; Gayon et al.,
2009; Hung et al., 2012).
Our proposed actor-critic method falls under the class of approximate dynamic pro-
gramming (ADP) or reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996;
Sutton and Barto, 1998; Powell, 2007). Possibly the most well-known RL technique is Q-
learning (Watkins, 1989), a model-free approach that uses stochastic approximation (SA)
to learn state-action value function (or “Q-function”). In some cases, convexity of the value
function is known a priori and can be exploited; see, e.g., Pereira and Pinto (1991); Powell
et al. (2004); Nascimento and Powell (2009); Philpott and Guan (2008); Shapiro (2011);
Löhndorf et al. (2013). The updates used in the value function approximation part of our
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algorithm most closely resembles Powell et al. (2004) and Nascimento and Powell (2009). Re-
lated to the policy function approximation part of our algorithm, Kunnumkal and Topaloglu
(2008) proposes a stochastic approximation method to compute basestock levels in contin-
uous state inventory problems. Our method also utilizes basestock structure, but does so
in a different way due to our focus on discrete-valued inventory states. The primary fea-
ture of an actor-critic algorithm is that it approximates both the policy and value function
(Werbos, 1974; Witten, 1977; Werbos, 1992; Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000). The “actor” is the
policy function approximation (for selecting actions) and the “critic” represents the value
function approximation used to “criticize” the actions selected by the actor. The novelty
of our proposed method is that both policy and value structure is utilized; further, differing
from most actor-critic methods, we do not use stochastic policy (which reduces the number
of policy parameters).
Due to the discrete inventory states used in our model, we make use of the concept of L\-
convexity (concavity) as a tool in the analysis. This theory was first developed in Fujishige
and Murota (2000) for discrete convex analysis and then extended to continuous variables
by Murota and Shioura (2000). Closely related concepts are L-convexity and submodularity.
It turns out that these ideas are useful in understanding the structures of optimal policies in
the field of inventory management, as introduced by Lu and Song (2005) in an assemble-to-
order multi-item system. Zipkin (2008b) uses L\-convexity in some variations of the basic
multiperiod lost-sales model with lead time and Huh and Janakiraman (2010) extends the
results to lost-sales serial inventory systems. Pang et al. (2012) uses similar ideas to analyze
inventory-pricing systems with lead time, and Gong and Chao (2013) studies finite capacity
systems with both manufacturing and remanufacturing. See Xin (2017) for a survey of
applications utilizing the theory of L\-convexity.
3 Model Formulation
As discussed above, our MDP model is motivated by the hierarchical structure of public
health organizations. We assume that inventory managers make replenishment decisions to
a POD in a sequential manner. Then, given an allotment of inventory for each period, on-
site dispensing decisions (i.e., how many kits of naloxone should be provided to a drug users
versus their family members at the mobile clinic?) are made by POD personnel through
maximization of the cumulative utility of the patients arriving in the period. The timing
of events during each period is as follows: (1) inventory replenishment occurs, (2) patients
arrive to the POD (their attributes and requests are revealed), and (3) inventory is allocated
to patients in order to maximize utility. Figure 1 gives an illustration of the timing of these
events. In this section, we first discuss the lower-level dispensing problem and then illustrate
the upper-level inventory control model. Throughout the paper, we refer to both the upper-
and lower-level decision makers (who may be different) as “the DM.”
6
· · ·<latexit sha1_base64="ILD3YtToexLbOb0tROUKzkEbjzA=">AAAB znicbVBNT8JAFHzFL8Qv1KOXRmLiibTGBLyRePEIiQUSIGS7PGBl2212X1VCiFePXvV3+Gf8Ny7YC+CcJjPzkpkXJlIY8rwfJ7e1vbO7l98vHBwe HZ8UT8+aRqWaY8CVVLodMoNSxBiQIIntRCOLQomtcHK/8FvPqI1Q8SNNE+xFbBSLoeCMrNTs8oEi0y+WvLK3hLtJ/IyUIEO9X/zuDhRPI4yJS2Z Mx/cS6s2YJsElzgvd1GDC+ISNcPa6LLmqsciYaRTO3auI0disewvxP6+T0rDam4k4SQljbiPWG6bSJeUuxrkDoZGTnFrCuBa2jcvHTDNO9gUFO9N fH7VJgpvyXdlr3JZq1WxvHi7gEq7BhwrU4AHqEACHJ/iAT/hyGs6LM3fe/qI5J7s5hxU477+It4Mw</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ILD3YtToexLbOb0tROUKzkEbjzA=">AAAB znicbVBNT8JAFHzFL8Qv1KOXRmLiibTGBLyRePEIiQUSIGS7PGBl2212X1VCiFePXvV3+Gf8Ny7YC+CcJjPzkpkXJlIY8rwfJ7e1vbO7l98vHBwe HZ8UT8+aRqWaY8CVVLodMoNSxBiQIIntRCOLQomtcHK/8FvPqI1Q8SNNE+xFbBSLoeCMrNTs8oEi0y+WvLK3hLtJ/IyUIEO9X/zuDhRPI4yJS2Z Mx/cS6s2YJsElzgvd1GDC+ISNcPa6LLmqsciYaRTO3auI0disewvxP6+T0rDam4k4SQljbiPWG6bSJeUuxrkDoZGTnFrCuBa2jcvHTDNO9gUFO9N fH7VJgpvyXdlr3JZq1WxvHi7gEq7BhwrU4AHqEACHJ/iAT/hyGs6LM3fe/qI5J7s5hxU477+It4Mw</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ILD3YtToexLbOb0tROUKzkEbjzA=">AAAB znicbVBNT8JAFHzFL8Qv1KOXRmLiibTGBLyRePEIiQUSIGS7PGBl2212X1VCiFePXvV3+Gf8Ny7YC+CcJjPzkpkXJlIY8rwfJ7e1vbO7l98vHBwe HZ8UT8+aRqWaY8CVVLodMoNSxBiQIIntRCOLQomtcHK/8FvPqI1Q8SNNE+xFbBSLoeCMrNTs8oEi0y+WvLK3hLtJ/IyUIEO9X/zuDhRPI4yJS2Z Mx/cS6s2YJsElzgvd1GDC+ISNcPa6LLmqsciYaRTO3auI0disewvxP6+T0rDam4k4SQljbiPWG6bSJeUuxrkDoZGTnFrCuBa2jcvHTDNO9gUFO9N fH7VJgpvyXdlr3JZq1WxvHi7gEq7BhwrU4AHqEACHJ/iAT/hyGs6LM3fe/qI5J7s5hxU477+It4Mw</latexit>
inventory decision inventory decision inventory decision
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
patient attributes
and requests
dispensing decisions
patient attributes
and requests
dispensing decisions
patient attributes
and requests
dispensing decisions
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
3.1 Dispensing
In each period t after inventory is replenished, the POD receives a batch of patient arrivals
and requests. The ith patient is represented by an attribute-request pair (ξit, Ait), where
ξit is interpreted as the patient’s attributes and Ait ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Amax} is the amount of
medication requested. The attribute-request realization (ξit, Ait) determines an increasing
utility function uξit,Ait(·) whose argument is the number of units yit dispensed to patient i.
These utility functions should be interpreted as a “parameter” specified by the public health
organization and are measured in units of dollars (Gyrd-Hansen, 2005).
As we discussed above, the motivation for modeling heterogeneous patients for the nalox-
one dispensing case is that opioid users themselves are 10 times as likely to make use of the
medication than non-users; thus, it is recommended that when inventory is scarce, we should
prioritize dispensing naloxone to opioid users (Bennett et al., 2018). To model this hetero-
geneity in demand, our model allows for “opioid-usage” to be encoded within the attribute
ξit, which then determines the utility. Moreover, we allow the utility function to depend on
the requested amount Ait.
The batch of arrivals in each period contains between zero and m patients. This is
modeled by assuming exactly m attribute-request pairs are revealed in each period, but
Ait is allowed to be zero for some i to represent the cases with fewer than m patients.
Suppose the quantity of inventory available at the beginning of period t is denoted zt.
The DM aims to maximize the total utility subject to this initial inventory allotment. Let
ξt = (ξ
1
t , ξ
2
t , . . . , ξ
m
t ) and At = (A1t , A2t , . . . , Amt ). Also, we let yt = (y1t , y2t , . . . , ymt ) ∈ Zm
be the dispensing decision made in period t, where component i refers to the amount of
inventory dispensed to patient i. Define the feasible set of dispensing decisions:
Y(zt, ξt,At) =
{
yt = (y
1
t , y
2
t , . . . , y
m
t ) : 0 ≤ yit ≤ Ait, ‖yt‖1 ≤ zt
}
,
which is simply the set of decisions that do not exceed the individual requests nor the total
inventory. The optimization problem solved at the on-site dispensing level is given by
U(zt, ξt,At) = maxyt ∈Y(zt,ξt,At)
m∑
i=1
uξit,Ait(y
i
t), (1)
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whose optimal solution has ith component denoted yit(zt, ξt,At). We note that decisions
made at the dispensing level are “myopic” in the sense that the optimization model (1) does
not assign value to leftover inventory. In other words, the POD staff will not turn away
patients whenever resources are available on-site (this modeling choice was made to reflect
reality). Any forward planning occurs at the inventory manager’s decision process, which
we now discuss.
3.2 Replenishment
The sequential inventory replenishment aspect of the model contains T planning periods. In
the first period t = 0, the initial resource level R0 = 0. In the last period t = T , no replen-
ishment decision is made and the remaining inventory RT is either worthless or charged a
disposal cost (controlled by a parameter b ≥ 0). Let {Wt} be an exogenous information pro-
cess which may contain information regarding past patients and demands, current weather
conditions, or other dynamic information related to the public health situation. The state
of Wt influences the distribution of the attributes ξt and the requests At. We assume that
Wt takes values in a finite set W and that it is a Markov process.
Let Rmax be the capacity of the POD. At the end of each period t, the DM makes a
replenishment decision based on the available resource level Rt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Rmax} and the
realization Wt ∈ W. The state variable is defined to be St = (Rt,Wt). We will often refer
to particular value of the state using the notation s = (r, w).
Let Z(r) = {r, r + 1, . . . , Rmax} be the set of feasible replenishment decisions if the
current inventory level is r, and let zt ∈ Z(Rt) be the replenish-up-to decision in period t.
This means the DM orders zt−Rt units of inventory with a unit order cost c. The transition
to the next inventory state Rt+1 is given by:
Rt+1 = zt −
m∑
i=1
yit(zt, ξt,At), (2)
where yit(zt, ξt,At) is the optimal dispensing decision to patient i, as described in the pre-
vious section. Each unit of leftover inventory after applying the transition (2) is charged a
holding cost h < c.
A policy {pi0, pi1, . . . , piT−1} is a sequence of a mappings from states St to replenishment
levels in Z(Rt). Let Π be the set of all policies; our objective is given by:
max
pi∈Π
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
−hRt − c (pit(St)−Rt) + U(pit(St), ξt,At)
)
− bRT
]
,
where Rt transitions according to (2) for zt = pit(St). We now write a preliminary set of
Bellman optimality equations for the objective above. Let V ◦T (s) = −br be the terminal
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value function (note: b is zero if there is no disposal cost). For t < T , we have
V ◦t (s) = max
z∈Z(r)
(c− h) r − cz +Ew
[
U(z, ξt,At) + V
◦
t+1
(
z −∑mi=1 yit(z, ξt,At),Wt+1)], (3)
where Ew is being used as shorthand for the expected value conditioned on {Wt = w}.
Notice that (c− h)r is increasing in r, yet the feasible space Z(r) decreases in r, suggesting
that the value function is not monotone in r.
Because monotonicity is a useful property for the derivation of structural results, we
will consider a reformulation of the Bellman equation using a technique that dates back to
Veinott and Wagner (1965); Veinott (1965, 1966). Notice that in (3), the term cr does not
affect the solution to the maximization. For each t, define Vt(s) = V ◦t (s)− cr. Substituting
this definition on both sides of equation (3), we obtain the following reformulation. The
terminal value function is VT (s) = −(b+ c) r and for t < T , we have
Vt(s) = max
z∈Z(r)
−h r − cz +Ew
[
U(z, ξt,At) + cRt+1 + Vt+1 (Rt+1,Wt+1)
]
= max
z∈Z(r)
−h r +Ew
[
U(z, ξt,At)− c
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) + Vt+1 (Rt+1,Wt+1)
]
, (4)
where the second equation follows by (2). The first equation above clarifies the intuition
of the reformulation, which simply accounts for the term c r in a different period. We also
define a post-decision value function (see Powell (2007) for a complete discussion) to be the
expectation term:
V˜t(z, w) = Ew
[
U(z, ξt,At)− c
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) + Vt+1 (Rt+1,Wt+1)
]
. (5)
The optimal replenishment policy can be written as follows
pi∗t (s) ∈ arg max
z∈Z(r)
V˜t(z, w). (6)
Our proposed algorithm will make use of the convenient formulation of V˜t(z, w) as an expec-
tation. Combining (4), (5), and (6), we obtain an equivalent formulation of the optimality
equation written using V˜t(z, w) and pi∗t (s):
V˜t(z, w) = −h z +Ew
[
U(z, ξt,At) + (h− c)
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At)
+ V˜t+1(pi
∗
t+1(St+1),Wt+1)
]
, (7)
with V˜T−1(z, w) = −(b + c)z + Ew
[
U(z, ξT−1,AT−1) + b
∑m
i=1 y
i
T−1(z, ξT−1,AT−1)
]
. This
formulation is useful for ADP for two reasons: (1) the maximization is within the expecta-
tion, so a data- or sample-driven method is easier to incorporate and (2) knowledge about
the policy pi∗t can be used within a value function approximation procedure. Indeed, our
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actor-critic algorithm will make use of the interplay between (6) and (7).
4 Structural Properties
In this section, we analyze the structure properties of the post-decision value function V˜t
and the optimal policy pi∗t . We remind the reader that our model uses discrete inventory
states. As opposed to the standard continuous inventory state approximation, this modeling
decision was made in order to accomodate the public health setting, where resources are
potentially scarce. Our structural analysis makes use the properties of L\-concave functions,
an approach used often in inventory models (Xin, 2017).
Definition 1 (L\-concave function). A function g : Zd → R ∪ {+∞} with dom g 6= ∅ is
L\-concave if and only if it satisfies discrete midpoint concavity:
g(p) + g(q) ≤ g
(⌈
p+ q
2
⌉)
+ g
(⌊
p+ q
2
⌋)
(8)
for all p, q ∈ Zd, where d·e and b·c are the ceiling and floor functions, respectively.
For the one-dimensional case, g : Z→ R, the condition (8) can be reduced to the simpler
statement: g(p) − g(p − 1) ≥ g(p + 1) − g(p) for all p ∈ Z. Throughout the rest of the
paper, we will use discretely concave to refer to one-dimensional functions that satisfy this
condition.
Assumption 1. For any attribute-request pair (ξit, Ait), the utility function uξit,Ait(y
i
t) is
discretely concave in yit. Moreover, the unit utility, denoted by ∆uξit,Ait(y
i
t) = uξit,Ait(y
i
t) −
uξit,Ait(y
i
t − 1), satisfies ∆uξit,Ait(yit) > c for all yit ≤ Ait.
The first part of Assumption 1 implies ∆uξit,Ait(y
i
t) > ∆uξit,Ait(y
i
t+1). The second part can
be interpreted as the public health organization placing a relatively high value on satisfying
a patient request (larger than the ordering cost c). In particular, it implies that when the
available inventory zt is increased by one unit, the change in the optimal overall utility
U(zt, ξt,At) can be divided into two cases: (1) it will increase by a value larger than c if∑m
i=1A
i
t > zt with the optimal solutions satisfying
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(zt, ξt,At) = zt; or (2) it will not
change if
∑m
i=1A
i
t ≤ zt.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, the following properties hold:
1. For each t and information state w, the postdecision value function V˜t(z, w) is dis-
cretely concave in inventory state z.
2. For each t and state s = (r, w), the optimal policy pi∗t (s) can be written as a series of
state-dependent, discrete basestock policies, with thresholds lt(w) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Rmax}:
pi∗t (s) = max{r, lt(w)}. (9)
10
It is optimal to make the inventory level as close as possible to lt(w).
Proof. See Appendix A.2 for the proof of Part 1. Part 2 then follows directly from (6).
We remark that the qualification “state-dependent” in Proposition 1 means that the
basestock levels depend on the state w of the exogenous information processWt. If r < lt(w),
it is optimal to replenish up to lt(w), while if rt ≥ lt(w), it is optimal not to replenish.
The quantity ordered is given by pi∗t (s) − r. For algorithmic reasons, we define vt(z, w) =
∆V˜t(z, w) to be the “slope” of postdecision state value V˜t(z, w). It holds that V˜t(z, w) =∑z
z′=0 vt(z
′, w), where vt(0, w) ≡ V˜t(0, w). Proposition 1 implies vt(z, w) ≥ vt(z′, w) for all
0 < z ≤ z′. The next proposition gives a recursive equation (based on the Bellman optimality
equation) that relates vt to vt+1. This result can be useful for computing benchmark solutions
for algorithmic testing.
Proposition 2. The slope of the optimal value function in the last time period satisfies:
vT−1(z, w) = −(b+ c) +Ew
[
∆U(z, ξT−1,AT−1) + b1
{
z ≤∑mi=1AiT−1}].
For each t < T − 1 and state s = (r, w), it holds that:
vt(z, w) = −h+Ew
[
∆U(z, ξt,At) + (h− c)1
{
z ≤∑mi=1Ait}
+ min
(
vt+1(Rt+1,Wt+1), 0
)
1
{
z >
∑m
i=1A
i
t
}]
,
where Rt+1 = z −
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
5 Structured Actor-Critic Method
In this section, we introduce the structured actor-critic algorithm for the POD inventory
control and dispensing problem. The goal of the algorithm is to approximate the postdecision
value function V˜ and the optimal (basestock) policy pi∗ by exploiting structure for both.
5.1 Overview of the Main Idea
Our algorithm is based on the recursive relationship of (7) and the properties of the problem
as described in Proposition 1. The basic structure is a time-dependent version of the actor-
critic method, which makes use of the interaction between the value approximations and
the policy approximations in each iteration. The “actor” refers to the policy approxmations
{p¯ik} and the “critic” refers to the value approximations {V¯ k}. If the optimal policy is
known, then the postdecision values can be calculated by (7); similarly, if the value function
is known, the optimal policy can be calculated by (6). The proposed algorithm applies these
two relationships in an alternating fashion.
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t t+ 1 t+ 2
policy {p¯ik}
value {V¯ k}
· · · Tt+ 3
· · ·
Figure 2: Illustration of the Structured Actor-Critic Algorithm
We represent the policy by approximate basestock thresholds {lk}, where lkt (w) is the
iteration k approximation to lt(w). Note that compared to a standard actor-critic imple-
mentation which tracks a stochastic policy for each state (Sutton and Barto, 1998), this is a
significant reduction in the number of parameters needed to be learned. As for the values,
we represent them as approximations {v¯k}, where v¯kt (z, w) approximates the discrete slope
vt(z, w) = ∆V˜t(z, w). According to Proposition 1, if the approximations of the slopes are
nonincreasing in z, then the approximate value function is concave.
These approximations are iteratively updated via a stochastic approximation method
(Robbins and Monro, 1951; Kushner and Yin, 2003). At each iteration, the algorithm
has three steps. In the first step, we observe an exogenous information sequence and the
attribute-request vectors for the whole planning horizon. In the second step, we observe the
value of the current state under the current policy approximations, subject to the observed
attribute-request vectors. This value is used to update the value approximations. Finally, in
the third step, we use the implied basestock threshold from the latest value function to update
our approximate policy. The relationships between the policy and value approximations are
shown in Figure 2.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use bar notation (e.g., v¯k or lk) to denote approx-
imations tracked by the algorithm at iteration k. On the other hand, we use hat notation
(e.g., Vˆ kt or vˆkt ) to denote observed values at iteration k (these are one-time observations
used to update the tracked approximations).
5.2 Algorithm Description
First, let us give some notation. The observed trajectory of the exogenous information pro-
cess {Wt} at iteration k is denoted {wk0 , wk1 , . . . , wkT−1} and the initial postdecision resource
level at period 0 is zk0 . The corresponding attribute-request vectors ξkt and Akt observed at
iteration k are assumed to follow the respective conditional distributions given wkt . Similarly,
let Zkt (w) be an independent realization of the the process (Wτ , ξτ ,Aτ )
T−1
τ=t conditioned on
Wt = w. This sequence of realizations is used to obtain an observation of the value of policy
approximation starting at t and Wt = w and we denote its elements by
Zkt (w) =
{
(wˇkτ , ξˇ
k
τ , Aˇ
k
τ ) : τ = t, . . . , T − 1
}
,
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where wˇkt = w. Define p˜ik as the rounded policy, i.e. p˜ik(r, w) = round[p¯ik(r, w)] for all
(r, w), where round[x] returns the nearest integer to x ∈ R. This is necessary because our
approximate thresholds will not be integer. Let ft(p˜ik−1;Zkt (wt), rt) be the Monte Carlo
estimate of the value starting in period t under the current policy approximations and an
initial state (rt, wt):
ft(p˜i
k−1;Zkt (wt), rt) =
∑T−1
τ=t
[−hp˜ikτ (rτ , wˇkτ ) + U(p˜ikτ (rτ , wˇkτ ), ξˇkτ , Aˇkτ )
+ (h− c)∑mi=1 yiτ (p˜ikτ (rτ , wˇkτ ), ξˇkτ , Aˇkτ )]− (b+ c) rT , (10)
where for all τ ≥ t+ 1, the resource levels transition according to
rτ = p˜i
k
τ−1(rτ−1, wˇ
k
τ−1)−
∑m
i=1 y
i
τ−1(p˜ikτ−1(rτ−1, wˇkτ−1), ξˇkτ−1, Aˇkτ−1), (11)
and for all τ ≥ t, the policy is p¯ikτ (rτ , wˇkτ ) = max{rτ , l¯kτ (wˇkτ )}. Although there is substantial
notation uesd in defining ft, we remark that it is simply a Monte Carlo observation of the
policy’s value.
At each period t, we use ft+1 to observe values Vˆ kt (zkt , wkt ) and Vˆ kt (zkt − 1, wkt ) implied
by the current policy p¯ik−1 to compute an approximate slope; specifically, for z ≥ 0, the
observation Vˆ kt (z, wkt ) is
Vˆ kt (z, w
k
t ) = −hz + U(z, ξkt ,Akt )
+ (h− c)∑mi=1 yit(z, ξkt ,Akt ) + ft+1(p˜ik−1;Zkt+1(wt+1), rt+1), (12)
where rt+1 = z −
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) and wt+1 is sampled from the distribution Wt+1 |Wt =
wkt . The approximate slope vˆkt is given by:
vˆkt = Vˆ
k
t (z
k
t , w
k
t )− Vˆ kt (zkt − 1, wkt ), (13)
where we define Vˆ kt (−1, wkt ) ≡ 0. By doing so, the value assigned to vˆkt when zkt = 0 is
actually Vˆ kt (0, wkt ). We now summarize the structured actor-critic method; the full details
of the approach are given in Algorithm 1.
• The inputs of Algorithm 1 are random initial basestock policy and concave, piecewise
linear value function approximations l0 and v¯0.
• Each iteration k consists of a loop through the time periods t.
• At period t, the approximate slopes are updated in Lines 4 to 6. Based on zkt and Zk,
we first observe the sequences of the predecision resource {rt+1, rt+2, . . . , rT } and the
postdecision resource {zkt , zt+1, . . . , zT−1}. These are computed according to (2), (11),
and the equation zτ = p˜ik−1τ (rτ , wkτ ) for all τ ≥ t+ 1. The observation of the slope vˆkt
implied by the policy p˜ik−1 is computed using (12) and (13) and used to calculate the
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smoothed slopes v˜t(z, w) in Line 5, where αkt (z, w) = α˜kt 1z=zkt 1w=wkt . Thus, only the
state (zkt , wkt ) is updated.
• A concavity projection operation in Line 6 is performed on the slopes v˜t, resulting in a
new set of slopes Πzkt ,wkt (v˜t), in order to avoid violation of concavity. The component
of Πzkt ,wkt (v˜t) at state (z, w) is
Πzkt ,wkt
(v˜t)[z, w] =

v˜t(z
k
t , w
k
t ) if w = wkt , z < zkt , v˜t(z, w) < v˜t(zkt , wkt )
or w = wkt , z > zkt , v˜t(z, w) > v˜t(zkt , wkt ),
v˜t(z, w) otherwise.
(14)
• The approximate basestock thresholds are updated in Lines 7 and 8. The observa-
tion in Line 7 is the maximum point of V¯ kt (·, wkt ) inside the set Z(0), which is the
implied basestock level from the value function approximation. In Line 8, the stepsize
is βkt (w) = β˜kt 1w=wkt .
• Finally, the next replenish-up-to decision follows an -greedy policy, which is to select
zkt+1 = p˜i
k−1
τ (rτ , w
k
τ ) with probability 1− , or take select zkt+1 randomly from Z(rkt+1)
with probability . In our numerical experiments,  is chosen to be 0.2.
Algorithm 1: Structured Actor-Critic Method
Input: Initial policy estimate l0 and value estimate v¯0 (nonincreasing in z).
Stepsize rules α˜kt and β˜kt for all t, k.
Output: Approximations {lk} and {v¯k}.
1 for k = 1, 2, . . . do
2 Sample an initial state zk0 .
3 for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
4 Observe wkt , ξkt , and Akt and then observe vˆkt according to (13).
5 Perform SA step: v˜kt (z, w) = (1− αkt (z, w)) v¯k−1t (z, w) + αkt (z, w) vˆkt .
6 Perform the concavity projection operation (14): v¯kt = Πzkt ,wkt (v˜t).
7 Observe implied basestock threshold lˆkt = arg maxz∈Z(0)
∑z
j=0 v¯
k
t (j, w
k
t ).
8 Update lkt (w) = (1− βkt (w)) lk−1t (w) + βkt (w) lˆkt .
9 If t < T − 1, take zkt+1 according to the -greedy exploration policy.
10 end
11 end
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5.3 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we give some theoretical assumptions and then state the convergence of
Algorithm 1; in particular, the convergence of both the value function approximation v¯k
and the basestock thresholds lk. Let {v¯kt }k≥0 and {lkt }k≥0 be the sequence of slopes
and the sequence of thresholds generated by the algorithm. For period T , we assume
vT (z, w) = v¯
k
T (z, w) = 0 for all iterations k ≥ 0 and all possible states (z, w), we also
assume lT (w) = l¯kT (w) = 0 for all iterations k ≥ 0 and all w, as we only need to learn the
policy and slopes up to period T − 1. We work on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where
F = σ{(rkt , zkt , wkt , ξkt ,Akt , vˆkt ), t ≤ T, k ≥ 0}. Moreover, we define
Fkt = σ
{{(rk′τ , zk′τ , wk′τ , ξk′τ ,Ak′τ , vˆk′τ ), k′ < k, τ ≤ T} ∪ {(rkτ , zkτ , wkτ , ξkτ ,Akτ , vˆkt ), τ ≤ t}},
for t ≤ T − 1 and k ≥ 1, with F0t = {∅,Ω} for all t ≤ T . Their relationships are Fkt ⊆ Fkt+1
for t ≤ T − 1 and FkT ⊆ Fk+10 .
Assumption 2. For any z and w, suppose the stepsize sequences {αkt (z, w)} and {βkt (w)}
satisfy the following:
(i) αkt (z, w) = α˜kt 1z=zkt 1w=wkt for some α˜
k
t ∈ R that is Fkt -measurable,
(ii) βkt (w) = β˜kt 1w=wkt for some β˜
k
t ∈ R that is Fkt -measurable,
(iii)
∑∞
k=0 α
k
t (z, w) =∞,
∑∞
k=0 (α
k
t (z, w))
2 <∞ almost surely,
(iv)
∑∞
k=0 β
k
t (w) =∞,
∑∞
k=0 (β
k
t (w))
2 <∞ almost surely.
Assumption 2(i) and (ii) ensures that only the slope and threshold for the observed
state is updated in Line 5 of Algorithm 2; the ones corresponding to unobserved states are
kept the same until the projection step. Parts (iii) and (iv) are standard conditions on
the stepsize. To keep the convergence results clean, we also assume the state-dependent
basestock thresholds are unique (this assumption can be easily relaxed).
Assumption 3. There is a unique optimal solution to maxz∈Z(0) V˜t(z, w), which implies
that there is a single optimal basestock threshold for each w.
Assumptions (1)-(3) are used for the next two results. Before stating the main conver-
gence result, Theorem 1, we introduce a lemma that illustrates the crucial mechanism for
convergence.
Lemma 1. For any fixed period t, suppose that the thresholds lkτ (w)→ lτ (w) almost surely
for all w and τ ≥ t+ 1. Then it holds that v¯kt (z, w)→ vt(z, w) almost surely.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
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Lemma 1 implies the convergence of the approximate slopes v¯k to the true slopes v as
long as the policy approximation converges correctly.
Theorem 1. The slope approximation v¯kt (z, w) converges to the slope of the postdecision
value function vt(z, w) almost surely for all (z, w) and t. The threshold approximation lkt (w)
converges to the optimal threshold lt(w) almost surely for all w and t.
Sketch of Proof. The proof depends inductively on Lemma 1. Given its result for period
t, we can then argue the convergence of threshold approximation lkt (w). This allows us to
re-apply Lemma 1 on period t− 1. The details are given in Appendix A.5.
5.4 Some Extensions
We now briefly discuss some possible extensions of the structured actor-critic algorithm. In
principle, any problem where structure in the policy and value can be identified a priori
may benefit from the general idea. To give a concrete example, consider the stochastic
cash balance problem, where the inventory is allowed to be either increased or decreased at
each period (Neave, 1970). It is shown in Whisler (1967) and Eppen and Fama (1969) that
when there is no fixed cost associated with changing the inventory, the optimal policy can be
characterized as a basestock policy with two thresholds. When the inventory level is between
the two thresholds, the optimal action is to do nothing, while if the inventory level is below
(above) the lower (higher) threshold, the optimal action is to add (reduce) inventory until
the threshold is reached. A modified structured actor-critic algorithm can be used to solve
this problem by tracking and updating two thresholds, while simultaneously estimating a
convex value function. We might also imagine variations on computing the observation of
vˆkt in Line 4. Instead of a Monte Carlo simulation until the end of the horizon, vˆkt could be
obtained by τ -steps of policy simulations (for some relatively small τ) with a value function
evaluation at the end.
6 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we test the performance of our algorithm empirically and compare its con-
vergence rate with other ADP algorithms on a common set of three benchmark problems
(small, medium, and large). Specifically, we compare with SPAR, a standard actor-critic
method with a linear architecture, a policy gradient method with a linear architecture, and
tabular Q-learning. We begin by giving a brief description of these algorithms.
• The multi-stage version of SPAR, introduced in Nascimento and Powell (2009), takes
advantage of the concavity of the value function and uses the temporal difference to
update slopes without a policy approximation. More specifically, SPAR replaces the
ft+1 term of (12) with maxz′∈Z(rkt+1) V¯
k−1
t+1 (z
′, wkt+1) in order to generate observations.
16
Although the original specification of SPAR uses does not use an exploration policy,
we implemented -greedy with exploration rate 2× 10−3 for improved performance.
• We implement an actor-critic (AC) method (Sutton and Barto, 1998) based on a linear
approximation architecture for both the policy and value approximations. In both
cases, the basis functions are chosen to be Gaussian radial basis functions (RBFs). The
“critic” approximates the value function using a weighted sum of RBF basis functions.
The “actor” is a stochastic policy with a parameter ht(s, z) for each state-action pair
(s, z), also approximated using a weighted sum of RBFs, which indicate the tendency
of selecting action z in state s. The associated stochastic policy is obtained through
a softmax function, so that the probability of taking action z in state s is pit(z | s) =
eh(s,z)/
∑
a e
h(s,a). Detailed steps of the method are shown in Appendix B.
• Our policy gradient (PG) method (Williams, 1992; Sutton et al., 2000) updates the
stochastic policy in each iteration. We adopt the Monte-Carlo policy gradient method
where the policy approximation follows the same softmax policy as in the AC algorithm
above. There is no value function and the policy parameters are updated using a
sampled cumulative reward from t to T .
• The previous two algorithms use linear architectures for generalization. We also com-
pare to the widely-used Q-learning (QL) algorithm (Watkins, 1989), which is called
tabular because each state-action pair is updated independently (structured actor-
critic and SPAR lie in-between these two extremes as they generalize by enforcing
structure). Q-learning aims to learn the state-action value function:
Qt(s, z) = −h r +Ew
[
U(z, ξt,At)− c
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) + Vt+1 (St+1)
]
.
Our implementation is a standard finite-horizon version of the algorithm that uses an
-greedy exploration policy at a rate of 0.2.
Optimal benchmarks used to determine the effectiveness of the five algorithms were com-
puted using standard backward dynamic programming (BDP). All computations in this
paper were performed using a combination of Julia (Bezanson et al., 2017), the modeling
language JuMP (Dunning et al., 2017), and MATLAB 2017a.
Benchmark Instances and Parameters. Our interpretation of the stochastic process
{Wt} is a prediction of the total demand (i.e., total requests) for period t. For benchmark-
ing purposes, we use the model Wt+1 = ϕtWt + Wˆt+1, where ϕt is deterministic and Wˆt+1
is an independent noise term that follows a mean zero discretized normal distribution with
standard deviation σt+1. In this paper, a continuously distributed random variable X is
discretized to Xdisc with P(Xdisc = x) = P(X ≤ x)−P(X ≤ x− 1). Given a demand pre-
diction Wt = wt, the realized demand quantity
∑m
i=1A
i
t is a discretized normal distribution
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with mean wt and standard deviation σ˜t. All of the means and standard deviations above
were generated randomly.
The maximum request from each patient is Amax = 5 and the realized requests are uni-
formly distributed integers between 0 and 5. We consider three patient classes, represented
by ξit ∈ {1, 2, 3} and the probabilities are 0.2, 0.4, and 0.4, respectively. For each demand
quantity realization, we randomly generated 10 different patterns of the attribute-request
sequences. The unit utility functions ∆uξit,Ait(y
i
t) were generated randomly and forced to
satisfy Assumption 1.
We consider three problem instances by varying the sizes of state, action, and outcome
spaces (i.e., number of possible values of the exogenous information); the parameters are
given in Table 1. The time horizon for each instance is T = 10 and the cost parameters
are b = 0, c = 7, h = 2. The initial resource level is R0 = 0 and the initial state of the
exogenous information is the mean of W0.
Table 1: Instance Sizes
Instance State Space Action Space Outcome Space
Small 303 101 3
Medium 5,050 101 50
Large 48,441 201 241
Results. To compute the value V p˜ik0 (s0) of an approximate policy p˜ik, we averaged the
value obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations following policy p˜ik. The percentage
of optimality κk is the ratio of V p˜ik0 (s0) to V0(s0), where the optimal value function V0 is
computed using BDP. For our three problem instances, κk is calculated every 20, 100, and
1000 iterations, respectively. Figure 3 shows the rate of convergence of the ADP algorithms
considered in this paper as a function of the number of iterations, while Figure 4 shows the
rate of convergence as a function of the computation time.
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Figure 3: Performance vs. Iteration Number
The policy approximations used in AC and PG are parameterized as stochastic policies
initialized to take uniformly random actions in each state. This exploration helps to generate
relatively high value in early iterations. AC and PG are very competitive with our S-AC
algorithm when observing performance versus iteration count, especially for the Medium
and Large instances. However, this comes at a computational cost: although stochasticity
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Figure 4: Performance vs. Computation Time
encourages exploration, Figure 4 shows that each iteration is particularly time-consuming
when compared to deterministic policies. We find that when per metric of computation
time, S-AC and SPAR outperform the other algorithms.
Next, we are interested in examining how the implied basestock thresholds evolve as
each algorithm progresses for a fixed w. The thresholds of AC and PG are selected as
the actions with highest probabilities for state r = 0 and the thresholds of SPAR and QL
correspond to the greedy policy with respect to the value function and state-action value
function approximations. Figure 5 shows the convergence of approximate threshold levels l¯k
as well as the optimal levels l in the first five decision periods for the Medium instance. The
thresholds generated by S-AC are seen to quickly converge to the optimal ones in all periods.
Due to the smoothing step of S-AC, the convergence is also observed to be relatively stable.
On the other hand, the thresholds of AC, PG and QL tend to either have large gaps to
the optimal thresholds or converge in a noisy manner. These results attest to the value of
utilizing the structural properties of the policy and value function.
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Figure 5: Convergence of Basestock Thresholds
From the results above, particularly Figure 4, SPAR seems most competitive with S-AC.
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To further investigate the seemingly more stable convergence of the policies generated by
S-AC versus SPAR in Figure 5, we construct the 99% confidence intervals of their values
κk by running each algorithm 20 times with different initial seeds; the results are shown in
Figure 6. This confirms that the behavior observed in Figure 5 indeed translates to policies
whose implemented value is also more stable, especially in early iterations.
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Figure 6: 99% Confidence Intervals of S-AC and SPAR
7 Case Study: Naloxone Dispensing
Our case study focuses on one part of the ongoing opioid overdose crisis, which is affecting
communities across the country. The rate of opioid overdose deaths tripled between the
2000 to 2014 (Rudd et al., 2016), with heroin deaths alone outpacing gun homicides in 2015
(Ingraham, 2016). Moreover, in 2015, drug overdose deaths in U.S. exceeded the combined
mortalities from car accidents and firearms (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2015a,b).
The root cause of the epidemic is often attributed to a recent increase in legal opioid use
(Berry and Dahl, 2000; Compton and Volkow, 2006).
Naloxone is an overdose reveral medication that can counter overdoses within seconds to
minutes. There is significant benefit for drug users, family members, community members,
law enforcement officers, and medical professionals alike to have training and access to this
“antidote” for use in risky situations (see Pennsylvania’s Act 139). However, a recent pressing
issue hindering the ability of public health organizations to fight the epidemic is the rising
prices of naloxone (Albright, 2016; Gupta et al., 2016; Luthra, 2017b).
For example, a widely used injectable version manufactured by Hospira, which was priced
at $62.29 per 10 mL vial in 2012, sold for $142.49 in 2016. Two other manufacturers, Mylan
and West-Ward, sell injectable naloxone at a steeper price of approximately $20 per 1 mL
vial. An even more extreme price increase can be seen in the Evzio single-use naloxone
auto-injector, which went from $690 in 2014 to $4500 in 2016 (for a two-pack) (Gupta et al.,
2016). There have been reports that price spikes negatively affecting the ability of harm
reduction organizations to provide naloxone.
Model. In this case study, we consider a somewhat simplified setting of a public health
organization where the procurement of naloxone and the dispensing of naloxone are han-
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dled by separate sub-organizations. We assume that the decisions on the dispensing side
follow our MDP model and then consider the following question: given a fixed budget for
procurement, how do the rising prices of naloxone influence the probability of operating a
near-optimal inventory/dispensing policy? In addition, we investigate the behavior of the
dispensing decisions when there are two classes of patients, opioid users and non-users.
Table 2: Parameters for the Case Study
Parameter Value Meaning/Explanation
Kit per claim 0.6† Kits of naloxone needed per opioid prescription claim.
WTP/kit $144 Willingness to pay for each kit. See next 2 rows.
WTP/QALY $50,000 WTP per quality-adjusted life-year. See Table 3.
QALY/kit 0.00287 QALY saved by one kit of naloxone. See next two rows.
QALY rate 0.652 QALY adjustment factor for lives saved by naloxone. Aver-
age of values in Table 4.
NNP 227 Kits of naloxone needed to be dispensed to prevent one over-
dose death (Coffin and Sullivan, 2013).
Rmax 300 Capacity of the mobile clinic.
Outcome space 31 Number of possibles values of Wt.
Amax 1 The maximum request quantity of a patient.
λ1 0.4 Probability of a PWUO arrival.
λ2 0.6 Probability of a non-user arrival.
u1,1(y) 144y/(2λ1)− a Utility function of PWUOs.
u2,1(y) 144y/(2λ2)− a Utility function of non-users.
c, h, b 8, 1, 1 Based on a $10 processing cost to dispense each kit of nalox-
one (Coffin and Sullivan, 2013).
† This value is explained in Appendix C.
The system consists of multiple demand locations, a mobile clinic, and a vehicle that
replenishes inventory in the mobile clinic. We consider a time horizon of one week.2 There is
a fixed schedule of demand locations visited by the mobile clinic, which follows the patterns
used by the Baltimore City Needle Exchange program; the full schedule is given in Table 5.
Since multiple locations are visited everyday with limited breaks between locations, we
assume that an inventory control and dispensing problem solved for each day on the schedule
(Monday-Saturday). The time periods of the six MDP models directly correspond to the
various scheduled locations within Baltimore, covering several zip-codes.
We thus also require a stochastic model of naloxone demand that is accurate both spa-
tially (at a zip-code-level in order to accomodate the granularity of the mobile clinic schedule)
and temporally. We acquired the following data for Maryland: (1) county-level, yearly drug-
related emergency department (ED) visit counts for 2008-2014 (Maryland Department of
2The time-horizon parameter is chosen based on the schedule in Table 5.
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Health and Mental Hygiene, 2015); and (2) zip-code-level, yearly Medicare Part D opioid
prescription claims for 2013 and 2014 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).
We use ED visits as a rough proxy for demand. Previous research (Wisniewski et al., 2008)
has shown a relationship between the opioid prescription claims and drug-related ED visits;
using these findings, we utilize the zip-code level claims data to infer zip-code estimates
ED visits. See Appendix C for details. Patients are categorized into two classes: PWUOs
(persons who use opioids) and non-users. The values of all parameters used in the case study
are given in Table 2.
Results. Let D1, D2, and D be the weekly demand for naloxone of PWUOs, the demand
of non-users, and the total demand, respectively. Recall that At is the request sequence at
period t, so D =
∑T
t=0
∑m
i=1A
i
t. D1 (D2) is the part of D that corresponds to PWUOs (non-
users). Let Q1, Q2, and Q be the quantity dispensed to PWUOs, the quantity dispensed to
non-users, and the total dispensed quantity under policy pi∗, respectively. In the dispensing
model, yit(zt, ξt,At) is the optimal decision at period t for the ith patient, so Q1 (Q2) is the
sum of y’s that corresponds to PWUOs (non-users). The quantity Q is the sum of all y’s plus
the remaining naloxone in the mobile clinic at the end of each day; it is the demand induced
by the optimal inventory/dispensing policy. We have D = D1 +D2 and Q ≥ Q1 +Q2.
(a) Q1(PWUOs) (b) Q2(Non-users) (c) Q(Total)
Figure 7: Quantity Dispensed over a Week
(a) PWUOs (b) Non-users (c) Satisfied percentage
Figure 8: Relationship between the Quantity Dispensed and Total Demand
Figure 7 shows the histograms of Q1, Q2, and Q. They are generated by 100,000 simu-
lations using the policy obtained after 2,000 iterations of S-AC. We then show Q1 and Q2
together with their corresponding demands D1 and D2 in Figures 8a and 8b. The percentage
of D1 being covered by Q1 is larger than the percentage of D2 being covered by Q2, showing
that PWUOs are being prioritized by the model. To see this more clearly, Figure 8c shows
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a histogram constructed from ratios of quantity dispensed to PWUOs (non-users) and the
demand of PWUOs (non-users) over all simulations. Figure 8c is explained by the fact that
the utility function for PWUOs, u1,1(y), is higher than the utility function for non-users,
u2,1(y), as shown in Table 2.
Next, we study the influence of price given fixed naloxone procurement budget B (sepa-
rate from the inventory costs). The relationship among the price p, the budget B, and the
procurement quantity Q˜(B, p) is Q˜(B, p) = B/p. Assume that base value of B always cov-
ers Q at the price point $20.34, which is 2009 price of an injectable or intranasal version of
naloxone manufactured by Amphastar (Gupta et al., 2016). With this assumption, when the
price is $20.34, the empirical induced demand distribution can be covered with probability
1 when budget is B. Figure 9 shows the relationship between the price and the probability
of Q being covered by Q˜(B, p) at different levels of the procurement budget. For a fixed
budget, the probability of covering the demand induced by the optimal inventory/dispensing
policy decreases sharply as the price increases.
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
0.5
1
Figure 9: Probability of Q˜(B, p) Covering Q
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we formulate a finite-horizon MDP model for the sequential problem of opti-
mizing inventory control and making dispensing decisions for a POD. We propose a novel
actor-critic algorithm that utilizes problem structure in both the policy and value approx-
imations (state-dependent basestock structure for the policy and concavity for the value
functions). We prove that both the policy and value converge almost surely to their opti-
mal counterparts; the proof builds upon ideas found in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996) and
Nascimento and Powell (2009). Although the algorithm is developed in the setting of our
specific MDP, the general paradigm of a structured actor-critic algorithm is likely to be of
broader methodological interest. Numerical experiments show that high-quality policies can
be obtained in a reasonable amount of time and that the convergence of the policy shows
is significantly less noisy when compared to competing algorithms. Lastly, we provide a
case study for the problem of dispensing naloxone to opioid users via mobile clinics and
investigate the influence of rising prices of naloxone.
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Appendices
A Proofs
In Appendix A.1, we first state and prove a few useful technical lemmas that were omitted
completely from the main paper. In the subsections that follow, we give the proofs of results
from the main paper: Proposition 1, Proposition 2, Lemma 1, and Theorem 1.
A.1 Additional Lemmas
Lemma 2. For any realization of the attribute-request vector (ξt,At), the optimal overall
utility function U(zt, ξt,At) is discretely concave in the initial inventory allotment zt.
Proof. First, let us introduce the notion of an L\-convexity applied to sets. The set A ∈ Zd
is called L\-convex if for all p, q ∈ A, ⌈p+q2 ⌉ , ⌊p+q2 ⌋ ∈ A, where d is an integer ((5.15) in
Murota (2003)). We can check that Y(zt, ξt,At) is an L\-convex set for any (ξt,At). Define
the set:
Y(ξt,At) =
{
(yt, zt) : zt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Rmax}, yt ∈ Y(zt, ξt,At)
}
.
Next, note that a sum of L\-concave functions is L\-concave. Thus, invoking Assumption
1, we see that
∑m
i=1 uξit(y
i
t) is L\-concave in (yt, zt). By Lemma 2 of Chen et al. (2014), a
“partial minimization” theorem in the discrete setting, we conclude that the optimal overall
utility U(zt, ξt,At) = max(yt,zt)∈Y(ξt,At)
∑m
i=1 uξit,Ait(y
i
t) is L\-concave in zt.
Lemma 3. The optimal value function Vt(r, w) is nonincreasing in the inventory level r for
all w and t.
Proof. We show this property by backward induction. The base case t = T holds because
VT (r, w) = −(b + c) r. The induction hypothesis is that Vt(r, w) is nonincreasing in r in
period t+ 1. We consider period t. Note that
Vt(r, w) = −hr + max
z∈Z(r)
V˜t(z, w),
so the only dependence on r is through the holding cost and the set of feasible decisions
Z(r). The term −h r is decreasing in r. By increasing r, the set Z(r) shrinks, so the second
term must also be nonincreasing in r. The claim is thus proved for period t.
Lemma 4. Let G : Z→ R be a nonincreasing, L\-concave function. Then, it holds that for
any fixed d, the function z 7→ G(z −min(z, d)) is L\-concave in z.
Proof. Define f(z, y) = G(z−y), which is L\-concave in (z, y) by Lemma 1 in Zipkin (2008b).
Thus, we aim to show the result for f(z,min(z, d)). Note that f(z, y) is nondecreasing in y,
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so we can write
f(z,min(z, d)) = maxy≤z, y≤d f(z, y).
By Lemma 2 in Chen et al. (2014), we conclude that f(z,min(z, d)) is L\-concave in z.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove part 1. Let us define the state-action value function (or the Q-value). The
terminal value is defined as QT (s, z) = −(b+ c) r and for t < T and replenishment decision
z ∈ Z(r),
Qt(s, z) = −h r +Ew
[
U(z, ξt,At)− c
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) + Vt+1 (St+1)
]
. (15)
We now prove the L\-concavity of Q-value by backward induction. Note that if this is
true, then the L\-concavity of V˜t follows. The base case is QT (s, z) = −(c + b) r, which is
L\-concave in (r, z), and the induction hypothesis is the same property for Qt+1(s, z).
We analyze (15) by breaking it up into three terms. The first term −h r is clearly L\-
concave. The second term we consider is U˜(z, ξt,At) = U(z, ξt,At) − c
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At).
The optimization problem (1) and the definition of the feasible set Y(z, ξt,At) shows that
we can always increase the objective by satisfying an additional request; thus, it holds that∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) = min(z,
∑m
i=1A
i
t). This means that requests are not denied if there
is enough inventory z. In addition, we observe that under Assumption 1, U˜ is discretely
concave, i.e.,
∆ U˜(z, ξt,At) ≥ ∆ U˜(z + 1, ξt,At). (16)
To show (16), we consider the following two cases.
1. When the total number of requests exceeds the inventory allotment, z ≤ ∑mi=1Ait, it
holds that U˜(z, ξt,At) = U(z, ξt,At)− c z and ∆ U˜(z, ξt,At) = ∆U(z, ξt,At)− c ≥ 0
by Assumption 1. By Lemma 2, we see that (16) holds for z ≤∑mi=1Ait.
2. When the total number of requests is small,
∑m
i=1A
i
t < z, there is no value of an
additional unit of inventory and it holds ∆ U˜(z, ξt,At) = 0. Thus, (16) trivially holds.
Moreover, if
∑m
i=1A
i
t = z, we have:
∆U˜(z, ξt,At) ≥ 0 = ∆ U˜(z + 1, ξt,At),
which completes the verification of (16). Now, since Vt+1(s) = maxz∈Z(r)Qt+1(s, z), Lemma
2 of Chen et al. (2014) shows that Vt+1(s) is L\ concave in r. Since Rt+1 can be written as
z −min(z,∑mi=1Ait), the final term Vt+1(Rt+1,Wt+1) is L\-concave in z by Lemma 4. L\-
concavity is preserved under expectations, so Qt(s, z) is L\-concave in (r, z). This concludes
Part 1.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The case of t = T − 1 is clear, so we focus on periods t < T − 1. We remind the reader that∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) = min(z,
∑m
i=1A
i
t). Since vt(z, w) = ∆V˜t(z, w), we can write
vt(z, w) = −h+Ew
[
∆U(z, ξt,At) + (h− c)1
{
z ≤∑mi=1Ait}
+ maxz′∈Z(Rt+1) V˜t+1(z
′,Wt+1)−maxz′∈Z(R′t+1) V˜t+1(z′,Wt+1)
]
,
where Rt+1 = z −
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z, ξt,At) and R′t+1 = z − 1 −
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z − 1, ξt,At). We have
the following three cases:
1. when z ≤∑mi=1Ait, Rt+1 = R′t+1 = 0;
2. when z =
∑m
i=1A
i
t + 1, Rt+1 = 1, R′t+1 = Rt+1 − 1 = 0;
3. when z ≥∑mi=1Ait + 2, Rt+1 = z −∑mi=1Ait, R′t+1 = z − 1−∑mi=1Ait = Rt+1 − 1.
Thus, vt(z, w) can be written as
vt(z, w) = −h+Ew
[
∆U(z, ξt,At) + (h− c)1
{
z ≤∑mi=1Ait}
+ maxz′∈Z(Rt+1) V˜t+1(z
′,Wt+1)1
{
z >
∑m
i=1A
i
t
}
−maxz′∈Z(Rt+1−1) V˜t+1(z′,Wt+1)1
{
z >
∑m
i=1A
i
t
}]
. (17)
We can now break up the analysis based on where the value function V˜t+1 is maximized.
There are two cases to consider.
1. If arg maxz′∈Z(0) V˜t+1(z′,Wt+1) < Rt+1, then by concavity
maxz′∈Z(Rt+1) V˜t+1(z
′,Wt+1) = V˜t+1(Rt+1,Wt+1),
maxz′∈Z(Rt+1−1) V˜t+1(z
′,Wt+1) = V˜t+1(Rt+1 − 1,Wt+1),
and (17) can be written as
vt(z, w) = −h+Ew
[
∆U(z, ξt,At) + (h− c)1
{
z ≤∑mi=1Ait}
+ vt+1(Rt+1,Wt+1)1
{
z >
∑m
i=1A
i
t
}
,
where vt+1(Rt+1,Wt+1) ≤ 0.
2. If arg maxz′∈Z(0) V˜t+1(z′,Wt+1) ≥ Rt+1, then by concavity
maxz′∈Z(Rt+1) V˜t+1(z
′,Wt+1) = maxz′∈Z(Rt+1−1) V˜t+1(z
′,Wt+1),
and (17) can be written as
vt(z, w) = −h+Ew
[
∆U(z, ξt,At) + (h− c)1
{
z ≤∑mi=1Ait}].
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In this case, vt+1(Rt+1,Wt+1) ≥ 0.
The desired relationship follows from these two cases.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Our proof builds on ideas developed in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996) and Nascimento and
Powell (2009), extended to the setting of both policies and values. Since the requests Ait
are bounded by Amax, we can see by Proposition 2 that there exists a vmax > 0 such that
|vt(z, w)| ≤ vmax for all t, z, and w. We first construct two deterministic sequences {Gm}
and {Im} such that G0 = v + vmax and I0 = v − vmax with
Gm+1 =
Gm + v
2
and Im+1 =
Im + v
2
. (18)
It is easy to show that
Gm → v and Im → v. (19)
Our goal in this proof is to show that for any m and sufficiently large k,
Imt (z, w) ≤ v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ Gmt (z, w). (20)
If (20) is true, then we can conclude the result of Lemma 1 by (19).
We now introduce a random set of states S−t that are increased by the projection operator
(14) on finitely many iterations k. Formally, let
S−t =
{
(z, w) ∈ S : v˜kt (z, w) < v¯kt (z, w) finitely often
}
.
Let K¯ be the random variable that describes the iteration number after which states in
S−t are no longer increased by the projection step; i.e., for all (z, w) ∈ S−t , it holds that
v˜kt (z, w) ≥ v¯kt (z, w) for all k ≥ K¯. We break apart (20) into two separate inequalities; this
proof will focus on showing that for a fixed m, there exists a finite random index Kˆmt such
that for all k ≥ Kˆmt ,
v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ Gmt (z, w). (21)
The state space S can be partitioned into two parts: (1) states (z, w) ∈ S−t and (2) states
(z, w) ∈ S \ S−t . The proof of (21) will consider each partition separately. We now define
some noise terms and stochastic sequences. Recall from (12) and (13) that vˆkt = Vˆ kt (zkt , wkt )−
Vˆ kt (z
k
t − 1, wkt ), where
Vˆ kt (z, w
k
t ) = −hz + U(z, ξkt ,Akt )
+ (h− c)∑mi=1 yit(z, ξkt ,Akt ) + ft+1(p˜ik−1;Zkt+1(wt+1), rt+1).
By our assumption that l¯kτ (w)→ lτ (w) for τ ≥ t+1 and the fact that ft+1(p˜ik−1;Zkt+1(w), r)
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depends only on the thresholds for periods t+ 1 onward, it follows that the simulated value
of p˜ik−1 becomes unbiased asymptotically:
Ew
[
ft+1(p˜i
k−1;Zkt+1(w), r)
]→ V˜t+1(pi∗t+1(r, w), w) a.s. (22)
We define the noise term kt (zkt , wkt ) such that
kt (z
k
t , w
k
t ) = E
[
vˆkt
]− vt(zkt , wkt ). (23)
Note that we can conclude from (22) that kt (zkt , wkt )→ 0 almost surely. We define another
noise term εkt (zkt , wkt ) such that εkt (zkt , wkt ) = vˆkt −E
[
vˆkt
]
. Thus, we can see that
vˆkt = vt(z
k
t , w
k
t ) + 
k
t (z
k
t , w
k
t ) + ε
k
t (z
k
t , w
k
t ) (24)
Next, we need to define some stochastic sequences related to these noise terms. Let {s¯kt } be
defined such that for k < K¯, s¯kt (z, w) = 0, and for k ≥ K¯,
s¯kt (z, w) = (1− αkt (z, w)) s¯k−1t (z, w) + αkt (z, w)
[
kt (z
k
t , w
k
t ) + ε
k
t (z
k
t , w
k
t )
]
. (25)
This sequence averages both of the noise terms. Since kt is unbiased and εkt converges to zero,
we can apply Theorem 2.4 of Kushner and Yin (2003), a standard stochastic approximation
convergence result, to conclude that s¯kt (z, w)→ 0 almost surely. We then define a stochastic
bounding sequence {g¯t} such that for k < K¯, g¯kt (z, w) = Gkt (z, w) and for k ≥ K¯,
g¯kt (z, w) = (1− αkt (z, w)) g¯k−1t (z, w) + αkt (z, w) vt(z, w). (26)
Part (1). As in Nascimento and Powell (2009), we provide an ω-wise argument, meaning
that we consider a fixed ω ∈ Ω (although the dependence of random variables on ω is omitted
for notational simplicity). Here, we show the existence of a finite index K˜mt such that for
all states (z, w) ∈ S−t , it holds that for all iterations k ≥ K˜mt , v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ Gmt (z, w). The
proof is a forward induction on m where the base case is m = 0. The base case can be easily
proved by applying the definition of G0 (note that we can select K˜mt ≥ K¯. The induction
hypothesis is that there exists an integer K˜mt ≥ K¯ such that for all k ≥ K˜mt , the inequality
(21) is true. The next step is m+ 1: we must show the existence of an integer K˜m+1t ≥ K¯
such that for all states (z, w) ∈ S−t , it holds that
v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ Gm+1t (z, w) (27)
for all iterations k ≥ K˜m+1t . We require the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The inequality
v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ g¯k−1t (z, w) + s¯k−1t (z, w) (28)
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holds almost everywhere on {k ≥ K˜mt , (z, w) ∈ S−t }.
Proof. When k = K˜mt , the relationship (28) can be shown using the definitions of g¯
k−1
t (z, w)
and s¯k−1t (z, w), along with the induction hypothesis (21). We now induct on k. Suppose that
(28) is true for a given k ≥ K˜mt . The inductive step is to show v¯kt (z, w) ≤ g¯kt (z, w)+ s¯kt (z, w).
To simplify notation, let αˇkt , vˇkt , sˇkt , and gˇkt respectively denote αkt (z, w), v¯kt (z, w), s¯kt (z, w)
and g¯kt (z, w). For state (z, w) = (zkt , wkt ), we have
vˇkt = v˜
k
t (z, w) = (1− αˇkt )vˇk−1t + αˇkt vˆkt
≤ (1− αˇkt )
(
gˇk−1t + sˇ
k−1
t
)
+ αˇkt vˆ
k
t − αˇkt vt(zkt , wkt ) + αˇkt vt(zkt , wkt )
= (1− αˇkt )
(
gˇk−1t + sˇ
k−1
t
)
+ αˇkt
[
kt (z
k
t , w
k
t ) + ε
k
t (z
k
t , w
k
t )
]
+ αˇkt vt(z
k
t , w
k
t )
= (1− αˇkt )gˇk−1t + sˇkt + αˇkt vt(zkt , wkt )
= gˇkt + sˇ
k
t .
The first equality is due to the fact that (z, w) = (zkt , wkt ), which is unaltered by the projec-
tion operator (14). The second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis (28). The
last three steps follow by (24), (25) and (26) respectively.
For (z, w) 6= (zkt , wkt ), which are the states that are not updated by a direct observation
of the sample slope at iteration k, period t, the stepsize αˇkt = 0. Then, we have
sˇkt = sˇ
k−1
t and gˇ
k
t = gˇ
k−1
t .
Therefore, from the definition of set S−t , the fact that K˜mt ≥ K¯, and the induction hypoth-
esis, we have
vˇkt ≤ v˜kt (z, w) = vˇk−1t ≤ gˇk−1t + sˇk−1t = gˇkt + sˇkt ,
which concludes the proof of (28).
Since Gm ≥ Gm+1 ≥ v for allm, when Gmt (z, w) = vt(z, w) = Gm+1t (z, w), the inequality
v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ Gmt (z, w) implies that v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ Gm+1t (z, w). Thus, the only remaining
states to consider are the ones where Gmt (z, w) > vt(z, w). Let δm be the minimum of the
quantity [Gkt (z, w) − vt(z, w)]/4 over states (z, w) ∈ S−t with Gmt (z, w) > vt(z, w). Define
an integer KG ≥ K˜mt such that for all states (z, w) ∈ S−t ,∏KG−1
k=K˜mt
(
1− αkt (z, w)
) ≤ 1/4 and s¯kt (z, w) ≤ δm.
for every iteration k ≥ KG. We can find such a KG because the stepsize conditions of
Assumption 2 imply that ∏∞
k=K˜mt
(
1− αkt (z, w)
)
= 0,
and because s¯kt (z, w) converges to zero.
Now we are ready to show (27). The definition of the sequence {g¯kt } implies that g¯kt (z, w)
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is a convex combination of Gkt (z, w) and vt(z, w), of the form
g¯kt (z, w) = αˆ
k
t (z, w)G
k
t (z, w) +
(
1− αˆkt (z, w)
)
vt(z, w),
where αˆkt (z, w) =
∏K−1
k=K˜mt
(
1− αkt (z, w)
) ≤ 1/4 for k ≥ KG. Because Gm ≥ v for any m, it
follows that
g¯kt (z, w) ≤ 14 Gkt (z, w) + 34 vt(z, w)
= 12 G
k
t (z, w) +
1
2 vt(z, w)− 14
(
Gkt (z, w)− vt(z, w)
)
≤ Gk+1t (z, w)− δm,
where the second inequality follows from (18) and the definition of δm. Recall that we are
concentrating on the case where Gmt (z, w) > vt(z, w), so δm is well-defined and positive.
This inequality, together with Lemma 5 and s¯kt (z, w) ≤ δm, imply that for all k ≥ KG,
g¯kt (z, w) ≤ Gk+1t (z, w)− δm + s¯kt (z, w) ≤ Gk+1t (z, w)− δm + δm ≤ Gk+1t (z, w).
We conclude Part (1) of the proof by letting K˜m+1t = KG.
Part (2). We now focus on the states (z, w) ∈ S \ S−t that are increased infinitely often.
For a fixed m and state (z, w) ∈ S \ S−t , we wish to prove the existence of a random index
Kˆmt (z, w) such that for all k ≥ Kˆmt (z, w), it holds that v¯k−1t (z, w) ≤ Gmt (z, w). Note that
Kˆmt (z, w) differs from K˜mt in that it depends on a specific (z, w) ∈ S \ S−t (while we K˜mt
is chosen uniformly for all states in S−t ). The crux of the proof depends on the following
lemma.
Lemma 6. Fix m ≥ 0 and consider a state (z−1, w) ∈ S \S−t and suppose that there exists
a random index Kˆmt (z, w) such that the required condition v¯
k−1
t (z, w) ≤ Gmt (z, w) is true,
then there exists another random index Kˆmt (z−1, w) such that v¯k−1t (z−1, w) ≤ Gmt (z−1, w)
for all iterations k ≥ Kˆmt (z − 1, w).
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 6.4 of Nascimento and Powell (2009). The only modification
that needs to be made is to redefine the Bellman operator ‘H’ from Nascimento and Powell
(2009) so that it maps to the optimal value function slopes v for any argument (we no longer
interpret H as a Bellman operator as our algorithm is not based on value iteration).
Consider some m ≥ 0 and a state (z, w) ∈ S \ S−t . Now, let state (zmin, w) where
zmin is the minimum resource level such that zmin > z and (zmin, w) ∈ S−t . We note that
such a state certainly exists because (Rmax, w) ∈ S−t . The state (zmin, w) satisfies the
condition of Lemma 6 with Kˆmt (zmin, w) = Kmt , so we may conclude that there is an index
Kˆmt (zmin−1, w) associated with state (zmin−1, w) such that for all k ≥ Kˆmt (zmin−1, w), the
required condition v¯k−1t (zmin− 1, w) ≤ Gmt (zmin− 1, w) holds. This process can be repeated
31
until we reach the state of interest (z, w), which provides the required Kˆmt (z, w). Finally, if
we choose an iteration large enough, i.e.,
Kmt = max
{
K˜mt ,max(z,w)∈S\S−t Kˆ
m
t (z, w)
}
,
then (21) is true for all k ≥ Kˆmt and states (z, w) ∈ S. A symmetric proof can be given to
verify that the other half of the inequality (20), v¯k−1t (z, w) ≥ Imt (z, w), holds for sufficiently
large k, which completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is a backward induction over time period t. The base case is
t = T , where the convergence of v¯kT (z, w) and l¯
k
T (w) to their optimal counterparts (both
equal to zero) are trivial by assumption (see Section 5.3). The induction hypothesis is that
l¯kτ converges to lτ almost surely for all τ ≥ t + 1. Now, consider period t. The almost sure
convergence of v¯kt (z, w) to vt(z, w) follows by Lemma 1. Therefore, by Assumption 3, we
can conclude that
lˆkt = arg maxz∈Z(0)
∑z
j=0 v¯
k
t (j, w
k
t )→ lt(w) a.s.
Combining this with the update formula for l¯kt (w), the stepsize properties of Assumption 2,
and Theorem 2.4 of Kushner and Yin (2003), we see that l¯kt (w) converges to lkt (w) almost
surely.
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B Actor-Critic Method
The actor-critic method is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Actor-Critic Method
Input: RBFs ψ(s) for the state value, and φ(s, z) for the policy.
Initial parameter estimate η0 and θ0.
Stepsize rules α˜kt and β˜kt for all t, k.
Output: Parameters ηk and θk.
1 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
2 Sample an initial state sk0.
3 for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
4 Observe ξkt , and Akt .
5 Take action zkt ∼ pik−1t (z|skt ,θk−1), observe the next state skt+1 and the
immediate reward Ct = −h rkt + U(zkt , ξkt ,Akt )− c
∑m
i=1 y
i
t(z
k
t , ξ
k
t ,A
k
t )).
6 Calculate the temperal difference δt ← Ct +ψ(skt+1)Tηkt+1 −ψ(skt )Tηkt .
7 Critic update: ηkt = η
k−1
t + α
k
t (s)δtψ(s
k
t ), where αkt (s) = α˜kt 1(s)=(skt ).
8 Actor update: θkt = θ
k−1
t + β
k
t (s, z)δt∆θk−1t
ln p˙ik−1t (z|skt ,θk−1), where
βkt (s, z) = β˜
k
t 1(s,z)=(skt ,z
k
t )
.
9 end
10 end
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C Naloxone Kits per Claim
Wisniewski et al. (2008) showed strong linear relationship between opioid prescription and
drug-related ED visit (the correlation coeficient for hydrocodone is 0.79 with p-value 0.0065,
for oxycodone is 0.76 with p-value 0.0088). In our case, Figure 10 shows the relationship
between yearly drug-related ED visit counts and yearly claims on the county-level in Mary-
land for 2013-2014. The regressions suggest approximately 770 claims correspond to one
drug-related ED visit. Consequently, using zip-code-level opioid prescription claim counts,
we can estimate zip-code-level drug-related ED visit counts. ED visits for opioid overdose,
however, cannot represent all the opioid overdose cases. About half of all nonfatal overdoses
call ambulances in Baltimore (Irwin et al., 2017), so we double the ED visit rate as an
approximate rate for opioid overdose. Considering that 227 kits of naloxone are needed to
be dispensed to prevent one overdose death (see Table 2), about 0.6 kits of naloxone are
needed to be dispensed per opioid prescription claim.
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Figure 10: Relationship between ED Visits and Claims (Aggregated to County Level) in Maryland
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D Tables
The tables mentioned in the paper are in this section.
Table 3: Standards for Evaluating WTP/QALY Ratios
Reference Value Explanation
Kaplan and Bush (1982) $50,000 A widely used value.
Hirth et al. (2000) $24,777 Human capital estimates.
$93,402 Revealed preference/non-occupational safety estimates.
$161,305 Contingent valuation estimates.
$428,286 Revealed preference/job risk estimates.
Shiroiwa et al. (2010) $62,000 For the respondent.
$69,000 For a family member.
$96,000 Social consensus.
Gyrd-Hansen (2003) $10,000 Results of a binomial logit model.
WTP: willingness to pay. QALY: quality-adjusted life-year.
In this table, we do not differentiate the value in different years, in other words, we ignore inflation
and rate.
Table 4: Rates to Adjust the QALY of Opioid Users
Reference Value Explanation
Zaric et al. (2000) 0.720 No treatment, non-IDU, asymptomatic HIV infected.
0.424 No treatment, IDU, with AIDS.
0.810 Under bup treatment, non-IDU, asymptomatic HIV infected.
0.477 Under bup treatment, IDU, with AIDS.
Harris et al. (2005) 0.590 Under met treatment, on drugs.
0.620 Under bup treatment, on drugs.
Nosyk et al. (2012) 0.750 No treatment, on drugs.
0.852 Under met or diac treatment, on drugs.
Schackman et al. (2012) 0.678 No bup-nx treatment, non-IDU.
0.588 No bup-nx treatment, IDU.
0.683 Under bup-nx treatment, non-IDU.
0.633 Under bup-nx treatment, IDU.
Bup: buprenorphine. Met: methadone. Diac: diacetylmorphine. Nx: naloxone.
IDU: injection drug user; Non-IDU: non-injection drug user.
“On drugs” means both IDU and non-IDU.
35
Table 5: Distribution Schedule of Baltimore City Health Department
Day Hours of Operation Location
Monday 9:30 AM - 11:30 AM Monroe & Ramsey; Greenmount & Preston
12:45 PM - 3:30 PM Fulton & Baker
6:00 PM - 8:00 PM Baltimore & Conkling (Highlandtown)
8:30 PM - 10:00 PM Milton & Monument
Tuesday 9:30 AM - 11:30 AM Montford & Biddle; Pratt & Carey
12:45 PM - 3:30 PM Fremont & Riggs; Barclay & 23rd
Wednesday 6:00 PM - 8:00 PM Baltimore & Conkling (Highlandtown)
8:30 PM - 10:00 PM Freemont & Laurens
Thursday 9:30 AM - 11:30 AM Pontiac & 9th Ave.; North & Rosedale
12:45 PM - 3:30 PM Milton & Monument; Monroe & Ramsey
7:00 PM - 10:00 PM Baltimore & Gay (The Block)
Friday 9:30 AM - 11:30 AM Park Heights & Spaulding; North & Gay
12:45 PM - 3:30 PM Fulton & Baker
6:00 PM - 8:00 PM Montford & Biddle
8:30 PM - 10:00 PM Monroe & Ramsey
Saturday 12:00PM - 4:00PM Fremont & Riggs
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